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Abstract. This paper argues that the instrumental reference to Russian ‘compatriots’ in 
Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 served as a discursive framing to justify contradictions 
in Russian approaches to state sovereignty to an international audience. Contrary to 
teleological readings of Russian foreign policy, however, the paper argues that while Russian 
diaspora policies have been tapped into, the iterative and partially contradictory development 
thereof on a governmental level suggests that these were not the blueprint for a revisionist 
foreign policy by design. It contextualizes the evolution of Russian diaspora policies against 
the background of the evolution of the wider ‘Russian World’ conception and shows how the 
discourse about the protection of ‘compatriots’ was contextual and has translated into 
geopolitical boundary-making at a time when relations between Russia and the West 
deteriorated.  
Keywords: Sovereignty, Russian foreign policy, Boundary-making, Territory, diaspora 
identity, Security 
 
Introduction 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 25 million Russians suddenly lived abroad, outside of 
the new state borders of the Russian federation. How the Russian government should deal 
with these citizens became a subject of domestic debate within Russia and provoked a stream 
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of scholarly studies on the subject (Aasland 1996; Kolstø 1993, 1995, 2001; Zevelev 1996, 
2001; Melvin 1995, 1998; Zevelev 1996, 1998; Shevel 2012). Speculations that these new 
Russian diasporas might form political opposition groups in their new home states, become 
advocates for irredentist territorial claims, or ‘vote with their feet’ and emigrate to the Russian 
federation fueled the demand for new policies towards these Russians abroad (Heleniak 2004, 
99).1 Policy responses ranged from Russian protests over new language and citizenship laws 
in the newly-independent neighbouring states (notably Estonia and Latvia)2 to new legislation 
in Russia aimed at defining ethnic and linguistic benchmarks for ‘Russianness’. Yet, despite 
speculation to the contrary (Kolstø 1993; Laitin 1995), the Russian government during the 
1990s did not devise transnational policies to influence Russians abroad in ways that would 
constitute an unlawful interference in the domestic affairs of other sovereign states. The latter 
is a principle in public international law explicitly underlined in Russia’s Foreign Policy 
Concept (2016) and continuously referred to by Russian officials.    
 Russia’s position on ‘state sovereignty’ was called into question with the outbreak of 
war in Georgia in 2008 in which Russia’s claims to ‘protect’ Russians abroad have been 
translated into a foreign policy objective that justified the use of hard military means. The 
protection of ‘compatriots’ in the Georgian breakaway provinces South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
featured prominently in Russia’s rhetoric to justify a ‘rescue mission’ for allegedly 
humanitarian reasons. A similar argument about the need to protect ‘compatriots’, this time 
around with an emphasis on Russian speakers abroad, was used again six years later to justify 
the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. This presents us with a puzzle that this paper posits 
to address: Russia’s use of its diasporas within a wider ‘Russian world’ as a means for 
geopolitical ends (and which observers have called territorial revisionism) breaches the 
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of other states that Russia’s elite discourse 
continues to make reference to. Ruth Deyermond (2016) has theorized on a dual approach to 
sovereignty that Russia applies: a ‘post-Soviet’ approach for its neighborhood where 
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sovereignty is contingent, and a ‘Westphalian’ model for states beyond its neighborhood, and 
it will be analysed here how diaspora arguments were put forward to smooth over such a 
contradiction in public diplomacy. Observed discrepancies between geopolitical strategies, the 
discursive framing of foreign policies, and international agreements, however, are not unique 
to Russia. Stephen Krasner has famously called sovereignty ‘organized hypocrisy’ (1999), 
arguing that the frequent violation of longstanding norms has been an enduring feature of 
international relations. The projection of a particular narrative is part and parcel of public 
diplomacy. The aim is to make an intended audience receptive to one’s own foreign policy 
objectives. States employ ‘strategic narratives’ to favorably influence other actors in 
international affairs (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle 2013).     
 Against this backdrop, it would be an analytical fallacy to assume that Russian foreign 
policy is inherently more ‘revisionist’ than that of other governments. The fine line between 
diplomacy and public relations is about the distinction between communicating policies and 
selling them. This is not unique to Russian foreign policy, but the terms may differ. Saari 
(2014) has found a distinction between a general ‘obshechestvennaya diplomatiya’ (public 
diplomacy) and Russia’s public diplomacy geared towards its post-Soviet neighborhood 
labeled ‘gumanitarnoe sotrudnichestvo’ (humanitarian cooperation’) (54). ‘Humanitarian 
cooperation’, as misleading as the term is in a Western understanding, is understood as the 
umbrella term for Russia’s policies towards its ‘compatriots’ abroad. This paper shows how 
the recurrence to such a ‘humanitarian’ aspect was used in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 
2014.             
 Blending a geopolitical analysis of the two conflicts mentioned with a conceptual 
discussion of the policy relevance of ‘Russian diasporas’, the paper thus conceptualizes the 
political instrumentalisation of Russian ‘compatriots’ abroad within the literature at the 
interstice of diaspora studies and conflict analysis. Case studies of the identities of Russian 
diasporas have been conducted elsewhere, in particular with a view to places where large 
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populations of Russians are to be found: Estonia (Kallas 2016; Smith 1999; Smith & Wilson 
1997; Lauristin & Heidmets 2003; Korts 2009), Belarus (Brüggeman 2014); Latvia (Smith 
1999), Ukraine and Kazhastan (King & Melvin 2000); and Central Asia (Kosmarskaya 2011; 
Ziegler 2006; Grigas 2016). Likewise, analyses of the evolution of the ‘Russian World’ 
concept have been conducted before (Bremer 2015; Gasimov 2012; Jilge 2014; Kudors 2014; 
O’Loughin, Toal & Kolosov 2016; Shchedrovitskii 2000; Tishkov 2008; Toal 2017; Zabirko 
2015; Zevelev 2014). Charles Clover (2016) has traced the Kremlin’s circumstantial embrace 
of Alexander Dugin’s ‘Eurasianist’ philosophy as well as that of other more nationalist 
movements to frame controversial foreign policies, from Russia’s second Chechen war to the 
2008 war with Georgia to the 2014 annexation of Crimea (249-332). In a recent study, 
Mikhail Suslov (2018) has usefully explored the nexus between political discourses on the 
‘Russian World’ concept and the logic of ‘spheres of influences’, tracing the non-linear 
iterations of a concept employed by a government in search of its international identity. 
However, the literature on diaspora identity and on ‘Russian World’ conceptualisations have 
not been brought together yet in an attempt to substantiate the debate about the 
instrumentalisation of Russian diasporas in conflict situations against the background of 
Russian approaches to state sovereignty.       
 On a conceptual level, this paper therefore adds to the literature on diasporas with a 
process-tracing analysis of the development of Russian ‘compatriot’ policies with a particular 
view to its politically instrumental nature in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014. The 
timely dimension to this subject also lends it substantial empirical significance that adds to 
our understanding of diaspora-related Russian foreign policy-making. Given the investigation 
of a link between geopolitics and identity narratives, such a purposive sampling is justified as 
a case selection technique. The aim here is not to provide a comparative classification of the 
diverse Russian diasporas abroad, nor to speculate on likely future policies in Russia’s 
neighborhood where the articulation of compatriot policies has not been translated into 
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military policies. Neither are other policy instruments discussed that have been associated 
with Russian compatriot policies elsewhere (politicization of history, ‘destabilisation’ policies 
that include the use of ‘hybrid’ and cyber warfare, or media policies).3   
 Instead, the analysis that follows focuses on the link between the evolution of the 
‘Russian World’ conception and Russian compatriot policies, and the use of these to justify 
geopolitical boundary-making. Methodologically, the political use of Russian diasporas in 
conflict situations will be analysed by way of qualitative document analysis of independent 
commissioned reports, primary Russian policy documents and the scholarly literature. The 
angle taken is that of a foreign policy analysis, where the rhetoric used by the Russian 
government will be embedded in a process-tracing analysis of the evolution of state policies 
towards Russians residing abroad (Beach & Pedersen 2013, 3).    
 The argument proceeds in three sections. A first section provides a brief conceptual 
overview of Russians abroad, and distinguishes between ethnic, linguistic, and other 
indicators used to classify Russians abroad as part of a ‘diaspora’. This section draws on the 
literature of diaspora studies and provides the conceptual foundation for this paper. A second 
section briefly outlines the evolution of Russian diaspora policies, and how Russians abroad 
became ‘compatriots’ in Russian governmental discourse during the Yeltsin and Putin 
administrations. A third section analyses how a discourse on Russian diasporas translated into 
military policies in two conflict situations: The war in Georgia in 2008, and the annexation of 
Crimea in 2014. It will be argued that these two conflicts reveal implicit contradictions in 
Russian public diplomacy and Russian approaches to ‘state sovereignty’. The political costs 
involved, however, were seen as being outweighed by strategic benefits.  
Russians abroad: A conceptual overview 
Defining diasporas has been notoriously difficult. King and Melvin (1999/2000) lament the 
‘semantic malleability of the label “diaspora”’ (113), and Brubaker (2005) even writes that 
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the term ‘diaspora’ has been ‘stretched to the point of uselessness’ (3). Most definitions, 
Brubaker continues, revolve around three main criteria: Dispersion (of a diaspora across state 
borders), ‘homeland orientation’ (broadly defined as a certain collective memory and 
emotional attachment to the ‘homeland’), and ‘boundary-maintenance’, which he defines as 
the ‘preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis a host society’ (6).4 These criteria have 
been emphasized in most other seminal accounts of diasporas (e.g. Armstrong 1976; Safran 
1991, 83; Cohen 1997, 24; Tölöyan 1996, 14).       
 Senses of belonging and identity, however, can overlap. Brah (1996, 208-9) therefore 
writes of a ‘diaspora space’ that is characterized by the contestedness of belonging and 
Otherness, and Faist (1998) writes in this context of a ‘transnational social space’ (216). 
Senses of belonging can be the result of ‘transethnic and transborder linguistic categories’ 
(Brubaker 2005, 3). This can create frictions between host and home countries, as it opens up 
the possibility for advocacy by foreign governments on behalf of their ethnic brethren abroad 
at the expense of immigration and assimilation policies in host societies (Moore & Davis 
1998). ‘Diasporisation’ has therefore come to be understood as the ‘ethnification of 
transnational connections’ (Kallas 2016, 2). Such a reading has given rise to analyses of the 
usage of diasporas for foreign policy goals on the part of their ‘homeland’ states. For instance, 
studies have analysed the links between diaspora politics and the potential for transnational 
mobilization of Russians abroad in the post-Soviet environment (Aasland 1996; Kolstø 1993, 
1995, 2001; Zevelev 1996; Melvin 1995, 1998; Zevelev 1996, 1998; Shevel 2012). Yet, 
besides the two cases discussed in a later part in this paper, there are only few examples of 
home states ‘protecting’ their diasporas militarily. Hitler’s claim to ‘protect’ Volksdeutsche 
residing outside of Germany’s current borders (by expanding these borders) is the most 
notorious example. Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974 is cited as another such example 
where the argument for military intervention as a protective measure has been employed 
(King and Melvin: 1999/2000, 116). The role of Serbia in the Bosnian war in the 1990s is 
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more complex and involved ethnoterritorial claims and the mobilization of paramilitary and 
transnational actors. Constraints on the ability of ‘ethnic patrons’ to either mobilize diasporas 
or employ the argument about diaspora protection in foreign policy include a ‘sense of 
attachment to the homeland among the dispersed ethnic group, competing foreign policy 
priorities within the kin state, and the economic resources that the kin state can wield to reach 
out to its diaspora’ (King and Melvin, 1999/2000, 110). ‘Diaspora politics’, King and Melvin 
(1999/2000) continue, ‘is in this sense more an antidote to irredentism than a catalyst for 
territorial conflict’ (136). The Russian diaspora is no exception, and is far from a 
homogenized entity (Smith & Wilson 1997, 846).      
 With a view to Russian speakers abroad, these definitions already indicate difficulties 
with the application of the term: Russian speakers can be well integrated into their host 
societies, so neither the criteria of ‘boundary-maintenance’ nor of ‘homeland orientation’ 
necessarily needs to apply. Russians abroad do not need to have a troubled relationship with 
their host society. Language, identity, ethnicity and citizenship, in other words, do not 
correlate in a straightforward way. Official Russian policy documents refer to the Russian 
diaspora as ‘ethnic Russians’ (russkie), ‘Russian speakers’ (russkoiazychne), ‘cultural 
Russians’ (rossiiane), ‘compatriots’ (sootechestvenniki), ‘countrymen abroad’ (zarubezhnye 
sootechestvenniki), or ‘fellow tribesmen’ (soplemenniki). The seemingly semantic fluidity 
reflects policy uncertainty over who is to be included, and by what criteria. As will be seen in 
the next section, Russia’s government has come to prefer the term ‘compatriots’ as a broader 
catch-all label that includes Russian speakers, ethnic Russians, and those with cultural ties 
with their ‘homeland’ and a wider ‘Russian World’ (Russian foreign ministry 2006).
 Rather than enticing Russians abroad to embrace revisionist policies or actively tie 
them into compatriot policies, ‘all ethnic groups with a cultural and historic link to Russia 
were “diasporized” through a growing reference to the Russian-speaking minorities in the 
former republics as “compatriots” (sootechestvenniki)’, Pilkington & Flynn (2001, 11) write. 
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Against the background of this (deliberate) semantic ambiguity, the remainder of this paper 
will shed light on the reference to ‘compatriots’ in the formation of Russian diaspora policies 
in a first part, while a second part discusses references to Russian ‘compatriots’ in conflict 
situations as an illustration of the translation of Russian compatriot policies into operational 
security policies.  
The perception of Russian compatriots in Russian foreign policy 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the fault line, Brubaker (2000) writes, ran ‘between the 
nationalizing nationalisms of Soviet successor states and the homeland nationalism of Russia’ 
(7). While Turkmenistan and Tajikistan were the only state to grant dual citizenship (Heleniak 
2004, 108), all other post-Soviet states granted only one citizenship with the goal of building 
nation and society on a civic (as opposed to an ethnic) basis. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these 
newly independent countries developed policies that would set them apart from Russian 
influence in what Tishkov (2008) calls the ‘anti-Russian component of post-Soviet 
nationalisms’ (31).          
 Policy responses of the Russian government initially were mixed. Russia did not 
encourage a mass return of its ‘beached diaspora’ (Laitin 1995), but rather engaged in 
advocacy on the Russian diaspora’s behalf to push for the granting of dual citizenship 
(Heleniak 2004, 111). This often went hand in hand with critiques of non-Russian states’ 
language laws. In 1992, the Russian government criticized Estonia and Latvia for 
disadvantaging Russian language-speakers (Hill and Gaddy 2013, 34-35). Both states had 
linked the granting of citizenship to residence and language requirements (Grigas 2016, 66). It 
was around this time that influential voices within Russia began to realize the potential of 
Russian diasporas as leverage tools in foreign policy. In late 1992, Sergei Karaganov’s name 
became attached to the idea that Moscow should see ethnic Russians residing abroad as a tool 
to gain influence in these regions (Smith et al. 2002, 161).5 Publicly emphasizing their right to 
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speak Russian, so an often-repeated reading went, would serve to keep the diaspora’s loyalty 
to Moscow and function as an entry point into the formulation of societal and economic 
policies of their new home states (Mackinnon 2014; Melvin 1995, 10).6    
 Yet, for all the myth-building surrounding the ‘Karaganov doctrine’, it has to be kept 
in mind that domestic debates within Russia were more complex and included a plethora of 
often conflicting voices (O’Loughlin, Toal and Kolosov 2016, 746-753; Zevelev 2001). 
Nationalist and communist political forces within Russia criticized the Russian leadership for 
what they perceived as a lack of interest in the fate of their co-ethnics abroad. Influential 
politicians like Anatoly Chubais were arguing that the Kremlin should promote and defend 
the rights of Russian-speakers in Russia’s ‘near abroad’ (blizhneye zarubezhye) (Chubais 
2003). Only gradually, the Russian government took an interest in Russians and Russian 
speakers abroad.          
 At the UN level, the Russian government started to couch its policies in the ‘near 
abroad’ in humanitarian terms that revolved around concerns for cultural, linguistic, 
economic, educational and political rights of Russians abroad (Smith 1999, 508). This 
discourse reached a new level that would lay the basis for later policy arguments when in 
September 1993 at the UN General Assembly, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev declared 
Russia’s ‘special responsibility’ for protecting Russian language speakers (including in 
Transnistria and the Baltic states). He also demanded the UN grant Russia primacy in future 
peacekeeping missions in the former Soviet republics (Hill & Gaddy 2013, 34-35). The 
Baltics would have none of that. ‘Russia thought that they could administer our independence 
post-1991’, an Estonian foreign ministry official told the author in an interview.7 Soviet forces 
had to withdraw, which they did by 1994. Russian troops, however, stayed in Georgia and 
Azerbaijan (Fischer 2016, 15). Additional Russian peace-keeping troops in Transnistria, 
Abkhazia, and South Ossetia began to cement Russian influence over new territorial 
delimitations.            
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 On an institutional level, the role of Russian language groups abroad was given more 
attention only gradually. It took until 2004 for an Agency for Compatriots Living Abroad to 
be established as a division of the Russian foreign ministry. The Department for Work with 
Compatriots Abroad at the foreign ministry was then established by presidential decree in 
November 2005 (Ziegler 2006, 121). While migration policy is a policy domain that falls 
within the competence of the interior ministry, the foreign ministry had thus been tasked with 
policy coordination to do with Russian diasporas (Russian foreign ministry 2017). The Putin 
administration had come to the realization by the mid-2000s that the presence of large 
diaspora populations in many of the non-Russian states in the post-Soviet neighborhood was 
going to remain a permanent feature of Russia’s neighborhood policies.8 The 2008 Russian 
Foreign Policy Concept commits the government to protect compatriots abroad, and identifies 
‘discrimination and the suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of the 
citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states’ as main threats to not only Russian 
compatriots, but also Russian security interests (Kremlin 2008; Hedenskog and Larsson 2007, 
33). Kristina Kallas (2016) thus writes: ‘The interchangeable usage of “compatriot protection” 
and “national interest protection” raised questions about the role compatriots might play also 
in serving “national interests”’ (emphasis in the original, 6).    
 After 2006, compatriot policies reached a new level of institutional consolidation. The 
foreign ministry set up a ‘department for relations with compatriots abroad’, and Coordination 
Councils of Russian diasporas were set up abroad to work closely with the Russian foreign 
ministry (Brüggemann 2014, 92).9 Moreover, state organisations like Roszarubezhtsentr 
(Center for Russians Abroad) served to support Russian-speakers residing abroad. 
Roszarubezhtsentr was turned into the new agency Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International 
Humanitarian Cooperation) in September 2008.10 But reaching out to Russian language 
diasporas was not only confined to government ministries.11 The use of the Russian language 
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as a politically unifying instrument has been a core purpose of the foundation ‘Russkiy Mir’. 
This foundation, founded in 2007 by a presidential decree as a joint project of the Russian 
foreign ministry and the ministry of education and Science, promotes the Russian language 
and culture abroad, and thus ‘reconnects the Russian community abroad with their homeland, 
forging new and stronger links through cultural and social programs, exchanges and 
assistance in relocation’, as the Foundation’s mission statement reads on its website (Russkiy 
Mir 2017).           
 Language here is linked to the preservation of a particular cultural community that sets 
the ‘Russian World’ apart from other, e.g. Western cultures, and it is at this point that a 
conceptual framework began to emerge that serves to bind together diaspora identity politics 
and cultural diplomacy. The focus on the link between language and culture harks back to the 
russkiy mir debates of the 19th century, in which the ‘Russian World’ became defined as the 
slavophile antipode to the European orientation of the Zapadniki (Gasimov 2012, 71). This 
rediscovery was promoted by an eclectic range of movements and actors, from Alexander 
Dugin’s obscure neo-Eurasianism (Mathyl 2002)12 to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).13 
The publication of Pyotr Shchedrovitskiy’s ‘Russkiy Mir and the Transnational Russian’ 
(‘Russkiy Mir I Transnatsionalnoje russkoye’) in 2000 is said to have marked the explicit 
politicization of the term: According to his conception, the ‘Russian World’ is made up of 
diverse language diasporas and transnational communities that can be used by the Russian 
state to gain access to financial and economic resources (Zabirko 2015, 5).14 In 
Shchedrovitskiy’s approach, Russians abroad not only form a linguistic community, but 
constitute a ‘geo-cultural’ leverage power for the Russian government (Tishkov 2008, 5). 
Andis Kudors (2014) summarizes the ‘Russian World’ conception as a ‘supranational 
structure that consists of Russia, the Russian diaspora living abroad and other so-called 
Russian-speaking communities, which consider Russia as their cultural and spiritual center’.
 The transnational character of the ‘Russian World’ concept and the post-Soviet 
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narrative of ‘Russia as a divided nation’ (Laruelle 2015b, 89) can therefore give the 
foundation with the same name an implicit political connotation (Petro 2015). Russian 
experts, however, emphasise that the purpose of ‘Russkiy Mir’ is not different from that of 
other cultural institutes such as the British Council, the German Goethe Institute or the French 
Francophonie. According to this view, the Foundation’s focus on the Russian language is 
inseparable from a wider ‘soft power’ mission to further Russia’s influence to the extent that 
the promotion of language and culture is part and parcel of a country’s foreign cultural 
policy.15 Tellingly, a Russkiy Mir representative recounts in an interview with the author how 
Rossotrudnichestvo came up with the idea of disseminating Crimea-related propaganda 
material in 2014, but that Russkiy Mir would have none of that. ‘When the government was 
suddenly using the term [Russkiy Mir] in the Ukraine crisis, we were taken by surprise’, he 
stated.16 The foundation ‘Russkiy Mir’ has to be understood as a government-funded initiative 
to promote not only the use of the Russian language (a ‘transborder linguistic’ category, 
Brubaker 2005: 3), but as a medium of Russian foreign (cultural) policy to create 
transnational links between ‘the homeland’ and Russian language-speakers abroad (Saari 
2014, 61; Zhurzhenko 2014; Laruelle 2015b; Kallas 2016, 8; Ryazanova-Clarke 2014). It 
serves to ‘diasporize’ dispersed Russians abroad by nurturing a sense of identity and 
belonging, by creating what Faist (1998, 216) calls a ‘transnational social space’. As a wider 
political term, however, the ‘Russian World’ concept has acquired a new political connotation 
in the context of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and the 2014 ‘Ukraine crisis’. The ‘Russian 
World’ concept had become a unifying conceptual umbrella that would link diaspora policies 
to an official level of cultural outreach diplomacy, but its articulation for geopolitical 
ambitions that would lay bare contradictions in Russia’s conception of state sovereignty only 
became an official talking point at a time of new tensions between Russia and the West. The 
instrumentalisation of Russian co-ethnics and language speakers abroad has meant the 
translation of the idea of a politico-cultural unification of the ‘Russian World’ into a 
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justification for military interventions, and it is to this aspect that the next section now turns 
its attention.  
Russian intervention in Georgia and the manufacturing of Russian diasporas 
Much has been made of the ‘Karaganov doctrine’ of 1992 as an ominous forerunner of events 
in 2008. As Sergei Karaganov told the author in Moscow, however, his ‘doctrine’ did not 
advocate for the military protection of Russians abroad. Its conceptual origins, as analysed 
above, lay in attempting to grapple with the post-Soviet legacy in addressing diaspora politics 
primarily by way of citizenship and language policies. When in August 2008 the Russian 
army invaded the sovereign territory of Georgia proper in response to Georgian military 
operations in South Ossetia, Russia’s stated need to ‘protect’ Russians abroad was translated 
into operational military policies. Russian diasporas came to be ‘weaponised’.17   
 For the argument here about Russian compatriot protection, the coming into being of 
that particular diaspora is relevant: Before the invasion of Russian troops and the resulting 
Georgian-Russian war, Russian passports had been handed out on a large scale in what has 
been called a policy of ‘passportization’ (Fischer 2016, 21; Grigas 2016). The Tagliavini 
commission, instituted as an independent fact-finding mission on the conflict in Georgia, held 
that the handing out of passports on a massive scale in Georgia prior to the war fulfilled 
criteria of extraterritorial collective naturalization and was therefore in breach of international 
law (IIFFMCG 2009, 155-178). Already in 2002, Russia had started a process of simplifying 
procedures for residents of de facto states to acquire Russian passports (IIFFMCG 2009, 18; 
Littlefield 2009; Mühlfried 2010). Grigas (2016, 42) notes that Russian ethnicity was not a 
prerequisite for passportization. The thus newly-naturalized Russians justified the Kremlin’s 
justification for its intervention of having to protect ethnic Russians from ‘Georgian 
aggression’ in the break-away Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While in 
most cases, Russia did not have to force Abkhaz and South Ossetians to adopt Russian 
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citizenship as it came with tangible travel, work and pension benefits, (Artman 2013, 690; see 
also Toal 2017, 140;),18 Russia’s passport policies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia gave it an 
empirical basis for the argument that the residents in these entities were ‘compatriots’ – an 
‘epistemic linkage between population and territory’ as Artman (2013, 694) calls it. He 
further argues that ‘passportisation’ has created ‘exceptional spaces’ within Georgia ‘where 
the norms of international law and the modern state sytem were effectively suspended’ (682). 
It had created Russian ‘spaces’ within Georgian de jure territory even before the fighting in 
South Ossetia began. Such a ‘manufacture of nationals’ (Green 2010, 72) redraws the 
territorial, legal, and biopolitical map. As Artman (2013) shows, it undermined Georgian 
sovereignty before any military intervention did.        
 The claim that passportization was merely intended to ‘help’ de facto state residents 
also ignores the geopolitical context in which passportization occurred. An overview of 
Russia’s motivations behind its military operations in 2008 and 2014 is beyond the scope of 
this paper. This has been thoroughly analysed elsewhere (Stent 2014; Toal 2017). Intra-
Ossetian and Georgian domestic politics under Mikheil Saakashvili after the 2003 ‘Rose 
Revolution’ played as much a role as contextual factors such as Russian concerns over 
geopolitics following the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit (which had failed to grant Georgia 
and Ukraine a Membership Action Plan, but did add that ‘these countries will become 
members of NATO’). A revisionist Georgian government was pushing back against an 
increasingly assertive Russia (Artman 2013, 689; Toal 2017, 166-190). And on a structural 
level, Putin had reportedly made it clear that Georgia was paying the price for the recognition 
of an independent Kosovo by most Western governments in 2008 (in: Asmus 2010, 106). 
Besides intra-Georgian politics, the negative atmospherics between Putin and Saakashvili and 
the particulars of Georgian-Russian relations, the 2008 war therefore also had instrumental 
value for broader Russian-Western relations. Different readings of Russian foreign policy in 
this episode lie at the heart of heated debates about conceptions of sovereignty, but also 
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expose the dilemma of regressive causality. One either subscribes to a reading that 
biopolitical arguments (compatriot policies) were merely put forward by a Russian 
government to justify territorial shifts, or to a reading that emphasizes revisions in the 
political status quo which promised potential revisions in the territorial status quo as well on 
the part of other powers which have triggered Russian interventions. The former reading 
focuses on a Russian government reevaluating its fading regional hegemony, bent on 
dominating its neighbors, the latter on actions on the part of the Georgian government, on 
NATO expansion plans, and on a perceived Western ‘encirclement’ of Russia.19 The US and 
the EU, according to the latter perception, had attempted to pull Georgia and Ukraine into the 
West’s orbit with its alleged complicity in the countries’ ‘color revolutions’ of 2003 and 2004 
(the latter coinciding with the 2004 NATO enlargement wave). The West, in contrast, seized 
on the narrative of ‘captive nations’ in Central and Eastern Europe following the end of the 
Cold War and argued that the finalité of regional integration projects was the eventual 
‘unification’ of the European continent. Without an appreciation of these two clashing 
geopolitical meta-narratives, we cannot understand the dynamics of a ‘politicisation’ of 
diasporas in public discourse.         
 What is thus relevant here for an investigation into the link between such military 
operations and ‘compatriot’ policies is that the more complex empirics of the respective 
conflicts were framed in a way that would justify Russian intervention as a ‘rescue mission’ 
of co-ethnics and compatriots against the invoked twin threats of ‘fascism’ and ‘genocide’ in 
neighboring sovereign countries. Russia presented its policies as reactions to a provocative 
and reckless Georgian leadership and as a necessary corrective to artificial borders of 
nominally independent states that were hiding more complex ethnoterritorial and 
sociopolitical realities (Medvedev 2008a). Russia’s UN ambassador Churkin invoked its 
‘inherent right to self-defense enshrined in Article 51’ of the UN Charter (Churkin 2008), and 
President Medvedev made recourse to a discourse that presented Russia as a patron state for 
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its citizens, whether they are residing in Russia or abroad: ‘In accordance with 
the Constitution and the federal laws, as President of the Russian Federation it is my duty 
to protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they may be’ (ibid.). The 
reference to ‘Russian citizens’ was not irrelevant during the intervention in the de facto states, 
given that Abkhaz do not consider themselves ‘Russian’ in any meaningful way apart from 
citizenship status (Petersen 2017, 98-99).       
 Four days later, Medvedev took the step to call the actions of the Georgian forces 
‘genocide’ (Medvedev 2008b). Similarly, Russia’s UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin and 
Russia’s foreign minister talked of ‘genocide’ when referring to Georgian military actions in 
South Ossetia – an instrumental language that implicitly justified Russia’s intervention for 
humanitarian reasons (UNSC 2008, 8; Fawn and Nalbandov 2014, 73). The Russian 
government thereby started to adopt a discourse emanating from Ossetia, and formulated a 
responsibility to protect Russian passport-holders from alleged genocide planned and carried 
out by the government in Tbilisi (Karagiannis 2014, 405; Allison 2008; IIFFMCG 2009). It 
also was quick to compare the situation with NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 in an 
attempt to end atrocities against ethnic Albanians.20 The Kosovo ‘precedent’ identified by the 
Russian government indicated that the Kremlin began to re-frame its Georgian operation as a 
humanitarian intervention, relying on a similar language that the West had used in 1999 – 
with the difference that ‘humanitarian cooperation’, as noted above, here referred to the 
protection of Russian ‘compatriots’ abroad. Russia had begun to conceptualise its very own 
‘responsibility to protect’ minorities abroad despite its previous resistance to the doctrine 
(Toal 2017, 185). Interestingly, however, Russia’s deputy foreign minister said on 13 August 
2008 that […]’ Russian peacekeepers will stay there and will be protecting the life, honor and 
dignity of the multinational population of these republics’ (Russian foreign ministry 2008, 
emphasis added). This reference to ethno-nationality, rather than citizenship-nationality, calls 
into question the political and symbolic value of what ‘passportization’ has achieved in the 
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two de facto states. Russia has helped to create a ‘transnational social space’ (Faist 1998, 216) 
characteristic of diasporas, but a ‘homeland orientation’ (Brubaker 2000, 6) has to grow 
organically. It is also important to note that the Kremlin did not adopt the position of Russian 
nationalists at the time favoring annexation of de facto states (even though it took the decision 
to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states on 26 August 2008). 
  
Crimea and the Donbas: Between absorption and reluctant protection  
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 as a reaction to a governance crisis in Ukraine 
triggered over Kiev’s derailed association agreement with the European Union (EU) and 
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich’s eventual flight to Russia was based on similar 
arguments to the ones presented in Georgia in 2008 pertaining to the need to protect 
compatriots (Ryazanova-Clarke 2015; Gaufman 2015), but focused much more on the 
Russian language argument, thus evoking a more emotive-cultural tie with the ‘homeland’. 
Emphasizing the need to protect Russian passport-holders, as in Georgia’s case, was not a 
prominent policy feature in Ukraine, because the need to protect ‘compatriots’ was based on 
the alleged linguistic discrimination of Russophones by the Ukrainian authorities. The new 
interim government in Kiev, in Putin’s speeches, constituted a threat to Russian speakers and 
religious minorities in Ukraine, and especially in the east and Southeast, including Crimea 
(Hill and Gaddy 2013, 365). Russia was alleging that right-wing, nationalist forces in Kiev 
were suppressing ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers (Stewart 2017, 18; Toal 2017, 223-
226).             
 The (unsuccessful) attempt made by the Ukrainian parliament to repeal the status of 
Russian as an official language on 23 February 2014 was read as a further confirmation of 
these fears. Following a similar narrative to that in 2008 about a humanitarian responsibility 
of the Russian state, Russian-language speakers thus needed to be protected.21 Lara 
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Ryazanova-Clarke (2015) writes that ‘[…] Russian speakers in Crimea and the East of 
Ukraine are categorized as belonging to the nation of the “Russian world” torn apart’ (9), 
which she defines as ‘linguistic weaponization’ (9). In his historic address on the occasion of 
the annexation of Crimea, President Putin thus referred to the ‘aspiration of the Russians, of 
historical Russia, to restore unity’ (Putin 2014a) and compared Crimea’s ‘reunification’ with 
Russia to the German reunification in 1989. On 17 April 2014, deliberately conflating 
Russians and Russian speakers, he further explained Russian actions as follows:  
The most obvious risk was that the Russian speaking population was threatened and 
that the threats were absolutely specific and tangible. This is what made Crimean 
residents, the people who live there, think about their future and ask Russia for help. 
This is what guided our decision […]. (Putin 2014b).  
The invocation of that threat was inflated with a discourse on the ‘fascist’ nature of the 
illegitimate government in Kiev (Putin 2014a), which presented Russian actions as a 
protective reactionary measure. The annexation of Crimea was not only a far-reaching claim 
of extraterritorial authority in a context of Russian-Western tensions over questions of 
regional integration, but a breach of international law and the principles of territorial integrity 
enshrined in the UN Charta, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and the 1990 Paris Charta (see also 
Grant 2015; Geiss 2015). It was also a violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which 
Russia had recognized ‘the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of 
Ukraine’ in exchange for Ukraine’s accession to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as a 
means of denuclearizing its Soviet-inherited nuclear arsenal.22 With this, the Russian 
government violated a principle it repeatedly mentions as inviolable (Stewart 2017, 11). 
 The wider political implications of Russian military support for its compatriots abroad 
is that it lays bare the contradiction inherent in Russia’s talk about non-interference and state 
sovereignty as inviolable principles of international law. Russian politicians have justified this 
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contradiction with reference to past Western violations of state sovereignty, and have cited the 
Kosovo case as the precedent that has opened a dangerous Pandora’s box on secessionism 
(Putin 2006). A discrepancy between discourse and behaviour is not an unsurprising finding 
in foreign policy analysis. The claim to protect populations divided by state borders, however, 
(Russia as a ‘divided nation’) raises legitimate concerns if combined with policies of 
territorial revisionism. International law and the conception of state sovereignty, so the 
outside impression, are seen as dispensable when clashing with Russian order conceptions in 
the post-Soviet space (see also Stewart 2017). Russia’s neighborhood policy focus of 
‘gumanitarnoe sotrudnichestvo’ (humanitarian cooperation’), in this reading, justifies a 
different approach towards the sovereignty of post-Soviet neighbors and Russia’s use and 
instrumentalisation of its diaspora to reach its geopolitical objectives in this region. Ruth 
Deyermond (2016) writes in this context of a dual approach to sovereignty that Russia 
applies, and identifies a ‘post-Soviet’ approach for its neighborhood where sovereignty is 
contingent, and a ‘Westphalian’ model for everyone else outside of it. This is an assessment 
shared by Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy (2015), who argue that Putin’s view of foreign 
affairs is conditioned by his perspective of US-Russian relations, and that he sees Russia as 
the only truly sovereign power surrounded by states with ‘contingent sovereignty’. Even 
scholars that do not buy into this rather exclusionary logic acknowledge that Russia’s 
discourse on sovereignty and territorial integrity, voiced in its official public diplomacy, has 
not been implemented consistently in Russian policies towards its neighbours (Sakwa 2017, 
257; Sherr 2013). With the annexation of Crimea, Moscow illustrated that Ukrainian 
sovereignty was seen as negotiable. Seen in the context of the ‘Russian World’ conception as 
laid out above, the Russian state ‘claimed’ diasporas that were connected to their homeland on 
a linguistic and perhaps emotive dimension, but not necessarily on a political one. There is 
ample evidence that a belonging to an ethno-linguistic Russian diaspora does not 
automatically translate into pro-government sympathies for the Russian ‘homeland’ (Tishkov 
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2008, 32-33; Smith 1999; Smith and Wilson 1997; Kosmarskaya 2011; Kallas 2016, 15; King 
& Melvin 2015, 115; Heleniak 2004, 114; Kolstø 2010; Toal 2017, 268-273).  
 Yet, speculations that Russia’s government might not consider the ‘Russian World’ to 
end at Russia’s international borders were further nurtured when the term Novorossiya (New 
Russia) re-entered Russian public discourse at a time when tensions surrounding Russian 
interference in Ukraine were high (see also Jilge 2014; O’Loughlin, Toal and Kolosov 2017). 
The Russian government now re-discovered a term that had been used during Tsarist imperial 
times to emphasise the common heritage between Russia and Southeastern Ukraine under the 
administrative control of Russia, but which had never had fixed spatial delimitations. 
Novorossiya was a geopolitical imaginary. With this re-discovered discourse, the Russian 
government linked its Ukraine policies to a conception of the ‘Russian World’ (as analysed 
above) that is not confined to the borders of the Russian Federation (Lavrov 2014).23 This was 
a deliberate semantic ambiguity with political connotations. Russia’s discourse on diaspora 
was now not only publicly linked to foreign relations with its immediate neighbors (this had 
been the case already in the 1990s, as shown above), but connected Russian-speakers or 
compatriots and the ‘Russky Mir’ concept with geopolitical policy goals. Appealing to a 
‘reunification’ in line with the idea of a ‘Russian World’ to justify boundary-making and the 
redrawing of political maps might not mobilise diasporas, but it instrumentalises their 
presence politically.           
 The casual and rare official references to the ‘Russian World’ concept, Yuri Teper 
(2016) holds, point towards its utility as a ‘fashionable catchphrase’ (387). The abandonment 
of this discourse as the secessionist movement in Southeastern Ukraine was faltering in 2015 
indicates that Putin’s government was reluctant to encourage a risky geopolitical maneuver on 
the basis of ethnolinguistic arguments. Having deliberately conflated ‘Russkiye’ and Russian 
speakers in the case of Crimea, the Kremlin now appeared eager to keep at bay those 
nationalists calling for a further redrawing of the map in Eastern Ukraine. Russia’s ‘rebirth’ 
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was framed as a national, as opposed to an imperial one, as Teper (2013, 389) points out. In 
2015, Lavrov stated in an interview that ‘Novorossiya is a fairly vague term’, and continued 
to make specific remarks on the ‘Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics’ (Lavorv 2015). 
The Kremlin ignored the appeal for Moscow to ‘absorb’ the self-proclaimed Donetsk Peoples 
Republic (Toal 2017, 265; Laruelle 2015a). And while the Russian Federation Council had 
passed a law facilitating the naturalization of Russian-speaking non-Russians in February 
2014 (Interfaks 2014), passport recognition from Donetsk and Lugansk was something that 
the Russian government was reluctant to pursue before 2017 (Fischer 2016, 22-23). Teper 
(2016) has contrasted an ‘unprecedented ethnicization of identity discourse’ to frame the 
‘reunification’ of Crimea with Russia with a ‘predominantly utilitarian approach toward 
Russian ethno-nationalism’ (380) in reference to the crisis in Eastern Ukraine. Despite the 
reference to the ‘Russian world’ in Putin’s March 2014 speech to justify an irredentist policy 
on Crimea, Russia made no consistent attempt to reunite compatriots elsewhere with their 
‘homeland’.           
 This suggests that the Russian government was well aware of potential reputational 
costs, and that military adventures on foreign territory that is much more heterogeneous 
ethnically than Crimea would hardly be possible to justify.24 And even in ethnically more 
clear-cut cases, Putin’s policy of denying political responsibility and investing heavily in PR 
activities to cover up a territorial annexation suggests that the Russian government knew that 
the argument of compatriot protection was highly controversial. Absent a solid legal 
legitimacy, Russia has justified its annexation of Crimea with a reliance on more emotive 
elements of diaspora conceptualisations (such as language, cultural, and historic links), 
combined with an invocation of threats from ‘fascists’.   
Conclusion 
22 
 
In an oft-quoted remark, Putin (2005) described the collapse of the Soviet Union as a ‘major 
geopolitical disaster of the century’. This collapse suddenly left tens of millions of ‘co-
citizens and compatriots’ outside the new borders of the Russian federation. Russian speakers 
were dislocated and deterritorialised. Following the legal doctrine of uti possidetis, new 
international borders now divided ethnoterritorial communities that previously had belonged 
to a larger biopolitical entity. The notion of Russia as a ‘Divided Nation’ (Laruelle 2015b), 
however, was mostly an academic hobby horse for much of the 1990s, and a cause for 
nationalists and revisionist intellectuals to critique the Russian government (Toal 2017, 74-
80). The Yeltsin government was slow to develop policies towards its ‘compatriots’ abroad, 
and was reluctant to encourage inward migration. The perception of compatriots slowly 
changed from being a liability (under Yeltsin) to being a potential foreign policy asset (under 
Putin). Research, however, has found that a sense of belonging to a language group is separate 
from political allegiances or a sense of belonging to a diaspora politically defined (Tishkov 
2008, 32-33; Smith 1999; Smith and Wilson 1997; Kosmarskaya 2011; Kallas 2016, 15; King 
& Melvin 2015, 115; Heleniak 2004, 114; Kolstø 2010; Toal 2017, 268-273). Such a finding 
suggests a weaker correlation between language – or even citizenship – and senses of 
‘national’ belonging than assumed by the Russian government. There seems to be less 
willingness on the part of Russian ‘diasporas’ to be mobilized for political causes. 
 Against this background, this paper has shown how the conceptual difficulties of 
defining diasporas were reflected in the array of terminologies used in Russian governmental 
parlance. Defining compatriots in a broad sense, Russia began to develop institutional 
structures, agencies, and programmes to pursue policies aimed at the ‘protection’ of the rights 
of compatriots abroad, the support of their linguistic identity, and the promotion of their 
cultural ties with the Russian ‘homeland’. Institutional consolidation from the mid-2000s 
onwards went hand in hand with a political rhetoric that made reference to a common 
civilizational space of a unified ‘Russian World’, of which the Russian language became a 
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defining feature. The vision of a ‘Russkiy Mir’ became known to a wider international 
audience through the founding of the foundation with the same name, but the concept was 
much older and had been promoted by different political groups, academic circles, and the 
Russian Orthodox Church long before the Kremlin started to politicize the idea of a Russian-
speaking world.          
 Lastly, this paper has traced how references to Russian diasporas became a politically 
useful tool to justify military policies to an international audience. The framing of the August 
2008 war as a ‘rescue’ mission of co-ethnic communities was used as a storyline by the 
Russian government. Thereafter, the notion of a ‘Russian World’ has gained a politically 
inflammatory connotation that raises questions about contradictions in Russia’s discourse on 
state sovereignty. The discourse to accompany direct military interference in Georgia in 2008, 
however, differed in nature from that accompanying Russia’s interference in Ukraine in 2014. 
The argument that Russophones were under threat from a fascist junta in Kiev justified 
military intervention in Ukraine in 2014. Such a ‘language factor’, however, played a less 
prominent role in Georgia’s breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Here, 
Russia referred to arguments about the need to protect co-ethnic Russians preceding the five-
day war with Georgia in 2008 following years of what critics have called a policy of 
‘passportisation’ of these two de facto entities.       
 A lose application of the term ‘compatriots’ has served as a catch-all label to justify 
policies intended to ‘protect’ whoever classifies as a compatriot by Russian governmental 
definition (ethnic Russians, Russian-speakers, ‘passportised’ compatriots). In addition, 
eclectic arguments have been put forward to complement diaspora policies. The invocation of 
a threat ranged from references to an imminent genocide (in Georgia) to a fascist government 
in Ukraine. Thus, while the argument to protect Russian compatriots was employed on a 
rhetorical level, circumstantial factors in both cases differed and complicate an essentialist 
reading of Russian ‘compatriot’ policies as an instrument for territorial revisionism. The 
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intended objective, it has been argued, was to explain the apparent contradictions in Russia’s 
approaches to state sovereignty to an international audience. Geopolitical motivations like the 
prevention of Ukraine’s and Georgia’s integration into Western institutional structures were 
thus being couched in a language on human rights and ‘humanitarianism’, by which the 
Russian government mainly understands the protection of Russian minorities in neighbouring 
countries.            
 The analysis presented here has shown how a discrepancy between Russia’s narrative 
projection about state sovereignty on an international level and breaches of the very same 
principle in its post-Soviet neighborhood were being smoothed out by ‘compatriot’ policies as 
a legitimizing factor. The instrumentalisation of identity politics as a discursive step to lay the 
groundwork for armed conflict became the means through which Russia justified 
controversial geopolitics to an international audience. Yet, as the conceptual evolution of 
Russia’s diaspora politics shows, this has been an iterative process rather than a brainchild for 
revisionist policies from the outset.  
Notes 
                                                          
1 For a critique of the idea of Russian diaspora groups as sources for mobilisation in opposition to their host 
governments, see Lieven (1998, 243-268). 
2 Russian protests over Estonian citizenship and residency requirements even led to a separatist referendum in 
the Northeastern Estonian cities of Narva and Sillamäe in 1993, which the Estonian State Council ruled illegal.  
3 See Grigas (2016) for a book-length analysis of how Russian compatriot policies have been used for what she 
calls ‘neo-imperial aims’ (3). Her work is based on the in-built assumption that Russian foreign policy is 
expansionist and is following a ‘re-imperialization policy trajectory’ (10), making conclusions preconceived 
because the argumentation is essentialist. Policy stages discussed include soft power (stage 1), humanitarian 
policies (stage 2), compatriot policies (stage 3), passportization (stage 4), information warfare (stage 5), 
protection (stage 6), and annexation (stage 7) (29-56).  
4 Brubaker (2000) adds the category of ‘accidental diasporas’ that can form ‘following a dramatic – and often 
traumatic – reconfiguration of political space’ (2). 
5 In a discussion with the author, Sergei Karagnov stated that the doctrine was ‘a mistake’, and described the 
evolution of the ‘doctrine’ as the outcome of a last-minute request by the foreign ministry in which he was 
asked to give a seminar on the status of Russians abroad. The proceedings of that seminar, Karaganov 
explained, became the basis for the ‘Karaganov doctrine’. Discussion with ‘young leaders’, including the author, 
at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow, 17 February 2017, organised by the PICREADI center. 
6 An Estonia foreign ministry official thus puts it in an interview: ‘Russia feels they [Russian speakers in Estonia] 
are their compatriots, we feel they are our compatriots. The diaspora has been instrumentalised.’ Author’s 
interview, Tallinn, 7 June 2017.  
7 Author’s interview, Tallinn, 7 June 2017.  
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8 At the same time, the Russian interior ministry has a programme for the encouragement of voluntary 
resettlement of Russians residing abroad. See Federal Law Nr. 77-F3 from 21 April 2011.  
9 In Estonia, for example, the ‘Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots in Estonia’ (Koordinatsionoj soviet 
rossijskikh sootechestvennikov Estonii) was set up in 2007 ‘under whose umbrella various compatriot 
organizations were united’ (Kallas 2016, 10).  
10 See Rossotrudnichestvo’s mission statement on their website: http://rs.gov.ru/ru/about. 
11 Or individuals that function as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Saari 2014, 59) like Moscow’s former mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov, who has been active reaching out to Russian speakers in Russia’s neighborhood, adopting 
programmes that promote legal, financial, or educational support for Russian compatriots (ibid.). The Moscow 
municipality, for example, established an International Council of Russian Compatriots (Laruelle 2015b, 91).  
12 Tishkov (2008) importantly points out how the intellectuals promoting the ‘Russian World’ concept were to 
be seen in opposition to Dugin’s idea of a ‘Eurasian continental bloc’ (7) that would also include countries like 
Iran and Turkey.  
13 The latter’s influence is noticeable through references to the ‘Holy Rus’ within the ‘Russian World’ concept 
and Patriarch Kirill’s repeated assertions that the ‘Russian world’ is a component of the Orthodox civilization 
(Kudors 2014). Yet, Bremer (2015) points out the paradoxical nature of the Orthodox Church’s emphasis on the 
use of the Russian language, while Russian Orthodox masses are being held in Church Slavic (7).  
14 Other influential intellectuals that helped advance such an interpretation were Gleb Pavlovskiy, Sergey 
Chernyshev, Yefim Ostrovskiy, and Maksim Shevchenko (Tishkov 2008, 4-5).  
15 Discussion with Prof. Sergey Markedonov, Associate Professor at Moscow State University, organised by the 
PICREADI center. Moscow, 18 February 2017. See also Gasimov 2012, 77.  
16 Author’s interview, Tallinn, 7 June 2017.  
17 For studies on the ‘weaponisation’ of language, see Lecercle & Riley 2005; Pratt 2009; Rafael 2012. The term 
has been used elsewhere to describe Russian policies on other policy front. Selective interpretations and the 
politicization of history have been read as a way to legitimize an increasingly anti-Western foreign policy from 
2012 onwards. As Hill and Gaddy put it: ‘From Putin’s perspective, if the West was going to try to create fifth 
columns in Russia, then he was going to do the same in Europe. Social values, nationalism, religion, language, 
history – everything could and would become part of the battlefield’ (352). 
18 In a discussion with the author, Sergey Markedonov  stated that ‘Passportisation’ was an important policy to 
help non-recognised citizens in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. ‘What were these people’s options if they would 
encounter health problems, but Georgia wouldn’t issue them passports and thus deny them access to social 
services and healthcare?’, he asked. Discussion with Prof. Sergey Markedonov, Associate Professor at Moscow 
State University, organised by the PICREADI center. Moscow, 18 February 2017. 
19 Author’s interviews and conversations with US, European, and Russian diplomats, former officials, and 
experts, 2011-2017. 
20 O’Loughlin and Toal (2015). write of an ‘earned sovereignty’ that Kosovo held due to its period of 
international administration. This differed in the South Ossetian, Abkhaz, and Crimean cases. 
21 ‘Eurasian’ intellectuals like Alexander Dugin and Alexander Prokhanov were instrumental in drumming up 
patriotic sentiments and mobilizing popular support, yet their direct influence on Kremlin is often exaggerated 
in the West (Laruelle 2015b, 90; 2017). See Clover (2016) for a book-length analysis of Dugin’s instrumentality 
for official Kremlin positions on nationalism.   
22 Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection to Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 19 December 1994. Available at [last accessed 22 May 2017]: 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/wiedenobwe_at_s_en/news/memorandum_on_security_assurances_in_connecti
on_with_ukraine_s_accession_to_the_treaty_on_the_npt?printMode=true. 
23 In August 2014, nationalist politicians Vladimir Zhirinovsky went one step further and even called on the 
Kremlin to annex Kazakhstan after the ‘integration’ of Crimea into the Russian Federation. See 
https://haqqin.az/news/29045. 
24 International tensions that the annexation of Crimea generated notwithstanding, the ‘reunification’ of 
Crimea with Russia, as it is called in Russia, enjoys a high level of legitimacy both within Crimea and in Russia 
(O’Loughlin and Toal 2015; O’Loughlin, Toal and Kolosov 2016). Southeastern Ukraine, apart from the fact that 
an annexation would be complicated logistically by the absence of clear boundaries, does not have the same 
historic-emotive significance (see also Tolz 2002). Russian nationalists have been disappointed by Kremlin 
policies in Eastern Ukraine (Kolstø 2016).  
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